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This thesis researches the provision of contractor 
technical support services for the architecture, 
integration, acquisition, and support of integrated and 
interoperable information solutions to support the National 
defense and the delivery of specific systems.  The support 
services required by the Government and examined in this 
report are in the functional areas of Program Management, 
Systems Engineering, Logistics, Installations, and Test & 
Evaluation.  These functions enable the Government to 
effectively and efficiently fulfill its mission.   
The current transition to Performance Based Service 
Acquisition (PBSA) and Multiple Award Contracts (MACs) have 
profound impact on program offices, and many organizations 
are venturing into these strategies concurrently and for 
the first time.  The intent of PBSA is “…to maximize 
performance, innovation, and competition – often at a 
savings.”1  MACs are intended to benefit Government and 
industry by encouraging healthy competition, which should 
result in fair and reasonable contract prices.    
This thesis examines the impact of PBSA and MAC 
contracting strategies on the Government program offices, 
along with the inherent cultural effects on both Government 
and industry.  The focus is on the effects and impacts of 
reengineering the acquisition support process and not the 
                     
1 Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 
(USA(AT&L)), April 5, 2000 
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contractual intricacies of the strategies.  There are some 
instances however, when contractual issues are so 
fundamental to the subject matter that they are addressed.   
2. Benefits of Research 
This thesis will primarily benefit Department of 
Defense acquisition activities and their industry 
counterparts in implementing, utilizing, and managing 
performance based service acquisition and multiple award 
contracts.  The critical review will help acquisition 
decision-making regarding the most effective means of 
employing performance based contracting.  It will also 
provide the ability to recognize the challenges and 
complexities in isolating, qualifying and quantifying an 
inherent aspect of work execution, which is embedded within 
the day-to-day routine.  
3. Research Approach 
The author strived to take an analytical approach by 
applying systems engineering theory and application to the 
subject matter, vice a contractual or organizational 
behavior approach.  Reference material included overarching 
policy, regulation, and law as applicable to an acquisition 
command within the Department of the Navy; particular 
organizational dictums such as work breakdown structure; 
and composite budget and contractual data.  In addition to 
isolating metrics garnered from pertinent history, the 
research uses documented observation, a survey of users and 
participants from Government and industry, and near-term 
projection on the organizational impact of embarking on 
these strategies.  The survey had the stated objective of 
quantifying and qualifying the use of contractor support, 
along with the subtle intent to draw a cognizance and 
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recognition of that usage by Government entities.  Although 
the amount and expense of Government contractor support is 
increasingly gathered and analyzed through many methods, 
the impact of “how” it is procured and managed is not. This 
recognition is, in itself, an objective of the research and 
thesis.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis research consists of a review of current 
and relevant literature and documentation, along with a 
survey and interviews provided to Government and industry 
representatives.  In order to get a wide range of feedback 
and perspective, effort was made to solicit responses from 
technical, business, contractual, and financial arenas.  
The respondents were from geographical locations throughout 
the Continental United States, and represented numerous 
Government and industry organizations.   In order to elicit 
as wide a spectrum of fresh inputs as achievable, 
relatively few inputs were received from the author’s own 
organization. Further, the respondents were assured 
anonymity in order to solicit and ensure the integrity of 
the responses; thus, there are no credits cited for these 
quotes.   
Government respondents were asked their experience in 
utilizing technical support contractor services.  Effort 
was made to gain a full spectrum of input from actual 
recipients of such support, the business and administrators 
of the processes, and corporate policy and strategy 
developers.  The questions were devised to obtain a basis 
to evaluate the respondent’s experience and knowledge in 
the procurement and use of these services, along with 
helping the individual to analyze this process. 
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Industry respondents were asked similar questions, 
however from a service-provider perspective.  Both groups 
were encouraged to “step back” from the day-to-day 
engagement, and assess the process more globally and 
critically.   
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis reviews the origins and objectives of 
Performance Based Services Acquisition (PBSA) and Multiple 
Award Contracts (MACs).  It also uses the experience of 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), an 
Echelon II Acquisition Command, as a case study of three 
stages of contracting strategy.  Chapter I provides an 
introduction and the scope of the thesis.  Chapter II 
provides the background and motivations for acquisition 
reform, which mandates the use of PBSA and MACs.  In 
Chapter III, the research methodology and the survey and 
reference material is discussed.   
Chapter IV presents the findings of the survey, from 
both Government and industry perspectives.  The focus is on 
factual and empirical data.  The author believes there is 
also value in the respondents’ opinions and anecdotal 
evidence, which in turn might lead to further exploration 
and opportunity.  This is followed by an analysis of the 
data in Chapter V, drawing comparisons between the 
respondent populations and with the literature research.  
Areas of omission, as well as conflict or affirmation of 
the information are found in this chapter. 
Chapter VI segues into the experience of an Echelon II 
Acquisition Command as its contracting strategy evolves.  
The chapter begins with a decentralized contracting 
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strategy, moves through an omnibus contracting structure in 
1999, and continues to the current evolution into 
Performance Based and Multiple Award Contracts. 
Finally, Chapter VII contains the author’s 
conclusions, recommendations, and lessons learned.  There 
are two goals in this chapter: first, there is potential 
application of the findings to improve the process and end 
result of utilizing technical support services.  Equally 
important is the possibility of discovering no opportunity 
to improve a particular process. This resultant  
situational awareness alone is valuable, in that it allows 
the organization to recognize the inefficiency.   
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research consists 
of the following steps. 
1. Conduct a comprehensive search of publications, 
training material, current research, thesis reports, 
internet-based materials and other library information 
resources dealing with Performance Based Service 
Acquisition (PBSA) and Multiple Award Contracts (MACs).  
2. Research the origins and catalysts for these 
approaches, experiences and findings to date, and projected 
and expected impact and results. 
3. Devise and construct a thorough survey, to 
collect first hand accounts and experiences from personnel 
representing all perspectives in executing these methods. 
4. Identify the target respondent populations and 
solicit responses to the survey.    
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5. Analyze and dissect the responses for both 
objective and subjective trends and indicators. 
6. Compare the survey findings with research 
findings. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
The author initiated the thesis from the perspective 
of an Echelon II Department of the Navy Acquisition 
Command, but ensured the survey and research encompassed 
all Echelons and services. The experiences of other 
organizations, both within and without the Department of 
Defense, will vary due to specific missions, organizational 
agility and structure, and additional factors.  This thesis 
does not presume to challenge the root causes for adopting 
these initiatives, nor how they are being enacted.  
However, it offers insight into the impacts of the change.  
The author believes the measure of effectiveness, at any 







Chapter II provides the background to allow the reader 
to understand the subject concepts and their origins.  This 
chapter discusses the political and acquisition environment 
of the 1990’s.  This led to current decisions of how to 
satisfy the need to acquire technical support services. A 
brief history of acquisition reform and how performance 
based contracting and multiple awards became the 
contracting methods of choice in today’s acquisition 
environment is presented.   
B. HISTORY 
… we begin a decade-long process of reinvention.  
We hope it will transform the habits, culture, 
and performance of all federal organizations.  2 
For over a decade, Government as a whole and the 
Department of Defense in particular have grappled with 
acquisition reform and the challenge of moving an unwieldy 
bureaucracy into a more efficient mode.  Where the private 
sector readily embraced state-of-the-art business concepts 
and streamlining in order to retain a market share, the 
public sector has lagged behind.  Now, however, declining 
resources have provided the catalyst to provide momentum to 
adapt these initiatives into the public sector.   James W. 
Fuhs provides an excellent historical perspective of the 
roots of one of these initiatives, Performance Based 
Contracting, in his thesis, “How the Implementation of 
Performance Based Contracting has Affected Program 
                     
2 Vice President Al Gore, Town Hall Meeting, Department of Energy, 
July 13, 1993 
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Management Within the Department of Defense”.  This 
perspective is briefly recapped here for the reader’s 
convenience, along with complementary data points.  Fuhs’ 
observations will be built upon in this paper, using the 
benefit of events and data gathered since he was published, 
and placing it in current context.  The historical 
highlights are not intended to be all-inclusive, but are 
meant to frame the forces that led to today’s environment. 
The foundations for this current research trace to the 
late 1980’s, and gained momentum in the early 1990’s with 
interlocking milestones.  The National Performance Review 
(NPR) of 1993 was the pivot point, from which the current 
mandates and strategies can be traced. It charted the 
course for a decade of change in the Government, and was 
based on the premise that Government’s business practices 
were “broken”. Only a thorough overhaul, from top to 
bottom, could repair it.  Among other issues, the NPR 
called for cultural change within the public sector, 
clarification and more effective outcomes from the 
processes, and metrics to measure those outcomes.  The 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) which 
became effective November 5, 1990, the establishment of the 
Defense Acquisition University, and increased training 
opportunities through the Defense Services Military College 
(DSMC) marked the Department of Defense’s (DoD) concerted 
effort to address the NPR mandates.  These steps began to 
address the specific training and skills that the 
acquisition workforce would need to modernize the 
Government’s business practices.   
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This recognition and focus paralleled an increase in 
service contracts awarded by the DoD.3  Figure 1 is devised 
from data accrued through FY 1997, and graphically 
demonstrates the trend that service prime contracts became 
a more significant portion of DOD prime contracts over that 
decade, growing by 16 percent. Equipment prime contracts 
experienced a comparable decrease during this period.   
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%
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Figure 1.   DoD Prime Contracts for Services, FY 88-97 
 
The DoD prime contracts for services totaled 
approximately $42 billion by FY 97, which accounted for 
approximately 36 percent of total Government prime 
contracts.  It is noted that the contracted services 
tracked and depicted above have been increasingly complex 
and quickly evolving.  
                     
3 GAO/NSIAD-98-105, Defense Spending Trends and Geographical 
Distribution of Prime Contract Awards and Compensation, August 1998 
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To put the this data in perspective and continue it 
forward, the next chart4 shows that the steep increase in 
service prime contracts leveled off as the new decade 
began, and proportions between the three segments have held 
fairly constant through FY 2003.  However, the tremendous 
increase in the 1990’s laid the groundwork for the 
Government/industry relationship we have today. 












 Figure 2.   DoD Prime Contracts FY 00-03 
 
The below figure presents the amount of overall 
contracting awarded by DoD, as compared to other Federal 
agencies5.  DoD is shown as the dominant purchaser of goods 
and services.  As such, it offers an excellent environment 
to study these topics.  The chart only reflects the larger 
                     
4 Federal Procurement Data System, Federal Procurement Reports, FY 
2000 through 2003.  Note that the data shown here varies from the data 
found in the Defense Contract Action Data System and cited in GAO-03-
935, for the same timeframe.  Reconciliation of the data is not within 
the scope of this thesis, but is a matter of interest for future 
research. 
5 Current Condition of Federal Contacting, May 8, 2001, Commercial 
Activities Panel, GAO 
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agencies whose procurements totaled $185.8B; total 
procurements in FY 2000 totaled approximately $204B: 






















Contracting Dollars by Organization, FY 00-03 
 
Figure 3.   Comparison of Purchasing by Federal Agencies, FY 
2000 
Figure 4 shows that the proportion directed for 
services has grown significantly from 28 percent to 42 
percent:6  
 
                     
6 Current Condition of Federal Contacting, May 8, 2001, Commercial 
Activities Panel, GAO 
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Figure 4.   Government Contracting Activity has Shifted 
 
Fuhs’ historical perspective is overlaid with this 
context, wherein the market trends described above 
converged with the acquisition reform initiatives 
instituted in the early and mid-1990s.  Among others, Vice 
President Gore and Secretary of Defense William Perry 
recognized the need for DoD and Government as a whole to 
embrace private sector’s business practices.  These are the 
origins of the public sector’s migration to Performance 
Based Contracting and Multiple Award Contracts. 
An additional driving force leading to the current 
environment is “competitive sourcing”.  In 1998, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Dr. John Hamre declared: 
We committed to compete 150,000 jobs.  …(t)he 
plan now is for 236,000 jobs that we are going to 
compete….we are very strongly committed and we’ve 
actually gone to a much greater commitment to 
competitive sourcing. 7 
Competitive sourcing entails identification of 
“inherently Governmental” functions, which must be retained 
                     
7 Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. John Hamre: Press Briefing, October 






















and performed by Government employees, and allowing 
industry to compete for all other functions historically 
executed within Government.  The expectation is that 
outsourcing functions wherever possible would allow an 
infusion of best commercial practices into the public  
sector.  It is also anticipated that the competition would 
intuitively result in lower costs with that adaptation of 
commercial innovation. 
Competitive sourcing also works to meet the challenge 
of the shrinking acquisition workforce within the 
Government.  The potential of this downsizing is depicted 
in the following graphic, derived from OPM data:8  
Figure 5.   The Shrinking Acquisition Workforce 
 
                     
8 Current Condition of Federal Contacting, May 8, 2001, Commercial 
Activities Panel, GAO.  Data from OPM’s Central Personnel Data File 























Govt-wide DoD (non-military) Civilian Agencies
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While the graphic above captures data through FY 2000, 
the following chart from 2001 offers a projection 
Government personnel retirements through post-2005:9 
 
 
Figure 6.   Percent of Acquisition Workforce Eligible to 
Retire 
 
This data is offered to allow the reader to frame the 
scenario of the trend in a diminishing Government 
acquisition workforce.  These retirements depict an exodus 
of acquisition knowledge and experience from the Government 
ranks. Further analysis of this data, particularly in 
regard to numbers and demographics related to workforce 
retirements, is not within the scope of this thesis. 
 
                     
9 Current Condition of Federal Contacting, May 8, 2001, Commercial 
Activities Panel, GAO.  Data from OPM’s Central Personnel Data File 
Proportion of Acquisition Workforce Eligible to Retire
Eligible to retire 
before 2001
9%
Eligible to retire after 
2005
69%





1. Performance Based Service Acquisition (PBSA): 
The essence of PBSA is for the buyer (the Government) 
to determine what it needs, articulate the end product or 
result, and allow the provider to determine how to satisfy 
that need.  Although this sounds rather logical and simple, 
it is a quantum shift from the prior long-standing practice 
of Government contracting.  Previously, the belief was that 
in order to ensure the Government, and by default the 
taxpayer, got its “money’s worth”, the buyer should detail 
not just the end product but also the methods and 
specifications of how the provider should achieve it.  With 
PBSA, the Government must clearly articulate the final 
product or service it expects as a result of the contract.  
It must do the research to select a contractor that can 
fulfill the stated expectation, and it must incentivize the 
contractor to perform and deliver.  It is also critical 
that the Government establish clear criteria, reflected in 
a formal quality assurance program, by which to measure 
performance.   It is a dramatic shift to restrain from the 
prior level of oversight, to the “hands off” approach which 
PBSA mandates. 
2. Multiple Award Contracts (MACs): 
Multiple Award Contracts (MAC) are the preferred method 
of task and delivery order contracting10.  Awards of the 
same contract, with a minimum contract value and ceiling 
value, are made to several vendors.  Individual orders are  
 
 
                     
10 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Section 
803 
  16
then written on the basic contract and competed among the 
pre-qualified contract awardees.  The advantages of MACs 
are: 
• Pre-negotiated terms and conditions, labor 
categories, fees, and rates 
• Pre-qualified vendor pool 
• Competition, which is expected to bring lower 
costs 
• Reduced time to award of tasks 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The primary driving forces which led to the current 
environment in contracting for technical support services 
are recognition of the need for a qualified and certified 
acquisition workforce; the adoption of private sector 
business practices; the markedly increase in the amount and 
extent of contracting for these increasingly complex 
services; and competitive sourcing. 
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III. RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter outlines the formulation of the survey 
and defines the objective of each question, along with a 
description of the respondent demographics. An outline of 
the literature review is also provided in this chapter.    
B. BACKGROUND 
In keeping with the intent of this thesis, the 
surveyed population included representatives from 
Government and industry, from all functional areas.  
Government representatives included technical and program 
offices; business and financial managers; contract 
specialists; and policy makers.  Industry respondents were 
in counterpart positions, providing or facilitating the 
provision of technical support services.  The respondents 
were from geographical locations throughout the Continental 
United States, and represented numerous Government and 
industry organizations.   In order to elicit as wide a 
spectrum of fresh inputs as achievable, relatively few 
inputs were received from the author’s own organization.  
C. SURVEYS 
1. Government Representatives 
The survey provided to Government representatives is 
comprised of the following questions: 
a. Do You Utilize Technical Support Contractor 
Services?   
The intent of this question was to baseline and 
categorize the currency of the Government employee’s 
familiarity and experience with utilizing technical support 
contractor services. 
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b. If So, for What Functions or in What 
Capacity? 
This question not only collected the range of 
technical support services utilized, it also captured the 
respondent’s understanding of and the ability to articulate 
the roles and limitation of those contractors. 
c. How is the Decision Made by Government to 
Utilize These Services, to the Extent and 
for the Purposes It Does? 
The response would expound both on the 
individual’s experience and on the extent of knowledge and 
involvement in the process.  
d. What are the Differences Between Government 
and Industry Work Product? 
This question moves the survey focus into an 
exploration of the distinction in roles and 
responsibilities of Government and contractor employees, 
and the limitations inherent in Performance Based 
contracting in the ultimate deliverable or work product. 
e. What is the Process and Frequency to Re-
Examine the Need and Usage for Contractors? 
Again, this query delves into the respondent’s 
involvement and understanding of MACs and PBSA contracts.  
It would be expected that the more instrumental the 
respondent is in the management of Performance Based 
program execution, the more requirements-oriented the 
response, vice level of effort. 
f. How Do You Obtain Contractor Support?   
The objective of this question is to measure the 
respondent’s understanding of his or her own organization 
and its business processes. 
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g. How Do You Interact with Those Personnel and 
Receive the Specified Services and 
Deliverables?   
There are pre-award and post-award aspects to 
this question.  As the organization moves to PB and MAC 
contracting, it is of interest to measure the awareness of 
Government personnel in keeping industry at “arms length” 
in order to permit fair competition during the pre-award 
phase.  After award, the measure becomes more focused on 
the Performance Based criteria and fulfillment of the 
Performance Work Statement, vice level of effort contracts. 
h. How Do You Evaluate the Success of Those 
Services and the Benefit to the Government?  
How Do You Convey That Level of Success to 
the Performer?  Is There any Method to 
Quantify the Return on Investment? 
This area investigates the respondent’s 
understanding of the Quality Assurance Plan through which 
the technical support services are evaluated.  It is a 
measure of how well the employee grasps the fundamentals of 
PB contracting. 
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i. What Other Experiences Do You Have with 
Contracted Technical Support? (For Example, 
Under What Situations or Through What Types 
Of Contracts?)  Are You Familiar with 
Performance Based Services Contracts or 
Multiple Award Contracts?  How Have/Will 
Either of These Contract Methods Effect 
Program Execution or How You Perform Your 
Job?  Is There Quantification as to the 
Effect These Contract Methods Has or Will 
Have on Your Program Office?   
These questions return to gaining an 
understanding of the individual’s experience and 
involvement in receiving these services on behalf of the 
Government. 
2. Industry Representatives 
Industry representatives were asked the following 
questions: 
a. What Extent of Your Business is with Federal 
Government, Specifically with Dept of 
Defense?   
The companies polled have varying degrees of 
business base with Federal Government, so this question 
measures that financial dependency.  
b. Is Your Company Large or Small Business?  
The ability for a business to compete for, win, 
and execute tasks and contracts is heavily influenced and 
limited by the size of that company.  This contributes to 
the company’s ability and the amount of resources available 
to comply with the latest procedural and regulatory 
requirements.  A small business certainly benefits from 
various set-aside criteria.  However, that same small 
business could be at a deficit when competing against large 
businesses in a full and open MAC, without the aid of a 
larger organic support structure. 
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c. What Types of Technical Support Services Do 
You Provide? (What Functions or in What 
Capacity)   
It was of interest to identify commonalities for 
categorizing purposes. 
d. How is the Decision Made by Government to 
Utilize These Services, to the Extent and 
for the Purposes It Does?   
This question pertains to the types of technical 
support services the subject company provides.  It is 
intended to explore the company’s premeditation in filling 
Government’s need and competing for a market share.   
e. What are the Differences Between Government 
and Industry Work Product? 
This question moves the survey into an 
exploration of the different roles and responsibilities of 
Government and contractor employees, and the limitations 
inherent in Performance Based contracting in the ultimate 
deliverable or work product. 
f. What Government Process are You Aware of to 
Re-Examine the Need and Usage for Your 
Services?   
Again, this query delves into the respondent’s 
involvement and understanding of MACs and PB contracts.  It 
also addresses the extent to which Government has 
communicated its knowledge and application of these 
contracting strategies. 
g. How Do You Interact with the Pertinent 
Government Personnel and Provide the 
Specified Services and Deliverables?   
There are pre-award and post-award aspects to 
this question.  It is incumbent on the Government entities 
to set the tone in Government/industry communications as it 
moves into awarding and using MACs and PB contracts.  This 
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question is designed to provide insight to whether the 
actual change in behavior, from level of effort taskings, 
is taking place. 
h. How Do You Evaluate the Success of Those 
Services and the Benefit to the Government? 
How Does Government Convey That Level of 
Success to You as the Performer?   
This question delves into the respondent’s 
understanding of the Quality Assurance Plan through which 
the technical support services are procured.  It is a 
measure of how well the employee grasps the fundamentals of 
PB and how the Government will evaluate the contractor’s 
success. 
i. What Other Experiences Do You Have With 
Providing Contracted Technical Support?  
(For Example, Under What Situations or 
Through What Types of Contracts?)   
This question returns to gaining an understanding 
of the individual’s or company’s experience and involvement 
in providing these services.  
j. Are You Familiar with Performance Based 
Services Contracts or Multiple Award 
Contracts?  How Have/Will Either of These 
Contract Methods Effect Your Decisions on 
What Tasks to Compete for or How You Perform 
Your Job?  Is There Quantification as to the 
Effect These Contract Methods Has or Will 
Have on Your Company? 
These questions measure the respondent’s 
familiarity with the subject matter and solicit input as to 
the quantifiable impact of these contracting methods on 
industry. 
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3. Respondent Population 
a. Government Population 
Completed surveys were received from government 
personnel in the following career fields and functions:  
Program Manager, Contracting Officer Representative (COR), 
Engineer, Logistician, Contract Officer, Contract 
Specialist, Acquisition Manager, Business/Finance Manager, 
and Small Business Advocate.  All  
respondents have a role and perspective in procuring, 
utilizing, or administering technical support contractor 
services.    
b. Industry Population 
Completed surveys were received from industry 
personnel in the following career fields and functions:  
Program Manager, Contracts Manager, Technical Points of 
Contact (TPOC), Proposal Manager, Engineer, Logistician, 
Acquisition Specialist, Business/Finance Manager.  All 
respondents have a role and perspective in providing or 
administering technical support contractor services.   
Twenty-eight percent of those surveyed are in the position 
to commit their company to proposing on MAC and PB 
contracts, 43 percent are able to assess the financial and 
workload variance from cost proposals for previous methods 
of contracting, and 57 percent are in direct charge 
positions, with first-hand responsibility in producing 
Performance Based work products.  The population is 
approximately evenly divided between large and small 
businesses.     
4. Literature Review 
The author utilized numerous routes to gain current 
and thorough understanding of the subject matter.  Among 
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the first sources to be tapped was the Dudley Knox Library 
of the Naval Postgraduate School.  The author accessed 
Fuhs’ earlier thesis within the Dudley Knox library, which 
was an excellent foundation on which to build.  The author 
also researched current publications; periodicals; 
instructional material; anecdotal and empirical evidence; 
legislation, regulation, and policy.  This research was 
largely predicated on using electronic searches by subject 
matter; publications and news articles; extensive 
utilization of both public and Government libraries; and 
programmatic briefing and issue documents.    The topic is 
pertinent to the author’s present position as the Command 
Contracts Program Manager, so there is firsthand knowledge 
and experience with the evolution of the organization’s 
technical support services contracting strategies.  The 
training and educational requirements inherent with staying 
current in this position also have contributed to the 
knowledge base.   
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter decomposed the demographics of the survey 
respondents into the first levels of Government and 
industry personnel, then secondary levels by functional 
groupings.  An in-depth analysis of the resultant data 
discussed in this chapter is presented in Chapter IV.  The 
chapter also discussed the literature research, along with 




This chapter presents the responses to the survey 
questions presented in Chapter III, from both the 
Government and industry populations.  It also describes the 
respondent demographics, with analysis into the functional 
and response groupings.  There is no influence on these 
responses by the author; the inputs are captured and 
excerpted as they were presented.  Although there are many 
direct quotes throughout this chapter, the respondents were 
assured anonymity in order to elicit and ensure the 
integrity of the responses; thus, there are no credits 
cited for these quotes. 
B. SURVEY RESPONSES 
Survey responses were received from 22 government 
respondents and 14 contractor respondents.  The respondents 
were from geographical locations throughout the Continental 
United States, and represented numerous Government and 
industry organizations.  In order to elicit as wide a 
spectrum of fresh inputs as achievable and to encourage 
objectivity, minimal inputs were received from the author’s 
own organization. 
1. Government Respondents 
The Government population included representatives 
from the following career fields and functions: Program 
Manager, Contracting Officer Representative (COR), 
Engineer, Logistician, Contracting Officer, Contract 
Specialist, Acquisition Manager, Business/Finance Manager, 
and Small Business Advocate.  All respondents have a role 
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and perspective in procuring, utilizing, or administering 
technical support contractor services.   Questions and 
responses are as follows:  
a. Do You Utilize Technical Support Contractor 
Services?   
All respondents answered in the positive. 
b. If So, for What Functions or in What 
Capacity?   
The number of response per functional area are 
presented: 
Function 













Contract Management within Tech Code 2
Non-inherently Government Contracting Functions * 4
R&D / Enhance Small Business Capabilities Database 1
* Described as support for paperless process: (1) paperless distribution of documentation to all 
parties (industry and Government), (2) scanning, and (3) use of the contractor’s maintenance of 
an electronic file room for the Directorate.  Other functions were described as reviews and 
comparisons of multiple databases to ensure all documents were correctly entered into the 
appropriate databases, and the pull and sort of data for various reports. 
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c. How Is the Decision Made by Government to 
Utilize These Services, to the Extent and 
for the Purposes It Does? 
1. Twenty seven percent of the respondents 
indicated that the current efforts had been contracted 
under prior contracts, so were continued under the current 
vehicles, but offered no explanation as to the rationale or 
analysis as to WHY it was outsource.  One of these offered, 
“…Program office senior leadership by identifying 
requirements and what can be outsourced”, but did not 
provide insight as to why outsourcing was preferred or 
required. 
2. Sixty four percent of the respondents 
indicated insufficient Government workforce, through 
attrition or downsizing, to perform and execute the work.  
Various descriptions use wording such as, “…necessary to 
augment…” and “…delta workload that Government personnel 
could not cover…” 
3. Twenty seven percent of the inputs made 
reference the use of contracted personnel as Subject Matter 
Experts (SMEs) for specialized skills or expertise not 
available from the Government workforce 
4. One respondent reported the need arose from 
a partnership with another Government agency, where “…[we] 
had the existing contract, they had the money.”  The 
respondent did not delve further into the rationale for 
contracting, vice performing the work in-house. 
5. Thirty six percent offered some analysis and 
quantification leading to the decision to contract for 
certain functions.  One of these inputs is captured here: 
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Tightened budgets and manpower restraints forced 
(the Command) to look for a more effective use of 
limited resources.  Given a limit on Full Time 
Equivalent (FTE) personnel and a (Department) 
trend to reduce the (pertinent) career field, 
(the Command) elected to transfer some non-
inherently Governmental work to contractor 
support.  From 1998 to 2005 the Directorate has 
reduced FTE from 65 to 56.  The contractor 
employed personnel to perform under this 
contract.  Through automation initiatives, the 
contractor support has been further reduced to 
1.5 man-years for approximately $600K. 
d. What are the Differences Between Government 
and Industry Work Product?  
Opinions differed on this question, ranging from 
“no difference”, to “higher quality from industry”, 
suggesting a value added from contracting the effort out, 
to “…lower quality since industry does not the ultimate 
responsibility for the product”.   It is noted that 45 
percent of the inputs indicated an awareness of inherently 
Governmental responsibilities.   Several of the responses 
are reflected as follows: 
1. “Industry does not have to be accountable 
for the quality of goods and services produced.” 
2. “I prefer to hire “industry” contractor 
support services in non-management roles that perform tasks 
in support of management.” 
3. “One thing in favor of the contractors is 
their flexibility and ability to find and hire personnel 
with specialist expertise.” 
4. “In addition to freeing manpower for higher-
level decision making vice administrative functions, 
contractor support is dedicated 100 percent to the 
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contracted functions.  By comparison a Government employee 
has a responsibility to attend training, participate in 
climate surveys, and other activities that support the 
general mission of the organization, but not the specific 
functions listed in a position description.” 
5. “As a general rule the industry product is a 
higher quality and have more timely deliverables.  This 
might or might not be due to contract incentives.” 
6. “My management philosophy is to use 
Government personnel only for functions that cannot be 
typically performed by contracted personnel as identified 
by either statute, higher-level policy, or by critical 
“management” functions.” 
7. “In some instances there is little 
difference between the work product of the Government and 
contractor.” 
8. “Generally, the contractors gather the 
information and consolidate into the required format.  The 
Government, with contractor input, makes the final decision 
on the work produce before it is submitted.” 
9. “Sometimes there is little or no oversight 
by the Government Technical personnel and work product is 
submitted with no chop by the Government.  This has been an 
accepted practice by (management).  When brought to their 
attention, they did not seem concerned that the contractors 
appear to be acting as Government personnel.” 
10. “The Government is in a management role, 
i.e., review funding status, review and determine 
requirements, do long range planning.” 
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11. “The system engineering task works closely 
with the Government and provides subject matter expertise 
as to technical decisions industry wants to make.” (NOTE: 
The author finds this comment of particular interest) 
12. “The task would provide analysis and 
recommendation to the Government team as to whether (a 
decision) offered a feasible change.” 
13. “In the case of logistics, the industry team 
produces products such as training materials, 
documentation, those items which are required before an 
install might be considered complete or before additional 
testing could occur.” 
14. “Have a contractor to do the specific tasks 
insures that they get done because that is their dedicated 
task.  The price difference is almost 50 percent less since 
lower priced administrative personnel are utilized.” 
e. What is the Process and Frequency to Re-
Examine the Need and Usage for Contractors? 
1. Eighty two percent of respondents indicate 
an annual review, in concert with the fiscal year spend-
plan review for the upcoming year, generally begun in 
March. 
2. One reported an additional mid-year review. 
3. One reported a review at the completion of 
the three year contract period, when there will be “…an 
assessment … to determine if more services are needed, or 
whether we have a usable product.” 
Further comments cited the following: 
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• “Every effort is made to control contractor 
growth and innovative ideas are practiced for that 
control.” 
• “It is attempted to cross train personnel for 
increased flexibility during high work periods and low work 
periods between programs.” 
• “We actually sit down with our field activities 
(and contractors are present) as we go through workload 
planning.” 
• “I review the mix of Government personnel and 
contractor support, matching them with functions, and 
weighing against cost.” 
• “We examine the need for contractors and the 
number that are required to meet our requirements.  In some 
instances, there is a need to reduce the number of 
contractors, but due to the ties to the individual, the 
effort is not eliminated or reduced.” 
• “On a longer term, (the organization) 
periodically conducts competition for support services.” 
• “The highest rated item from an employee survey 
was having a support contractor to do the clerical tasks so 
personnel could do their job….  Each year the amount of 
work performed in the previous year and the amount of work 
remaining for the future is reviewed. Any new automation 
processes that might have reduced the labor are examined.  
The need will always be there as long as the Government 





f. How Do You Obtain Contractor Support?  
All respondents referenced contract vehicles 
“approved” and recognized within their Command.  One 
respondent acknowledged the following: 
Most technical support is obtained from (other than 
Command-wide) contracts.  They were used by the 
Program Office as a way to get to individuals that 
they wanted on the technical team.  They are often 
retired or former military officers/enlisted that PM 
has worked with in the past.  I am only aware of one 
technical contractor that supports the program that 
did not have prior experience with someone on the 
Government technical side.  In some instances the 
individuals were told which companies they should talk 
to in order to get a position with the program office.  
…(Command-wide contracts) are also used to obtain 
technical support.  Again they were used to get to 
individuals that the Government technical team had 
worked with.  When criticism of these practices were 
raised to management, they were met with resistance 
and rarely did it change the contracting process. 
    
g. How Do You Interact with Those Personnel and 
Receive the Specified Services and 
Deliverables?   
There were several interpretations of these 
questions, with responses as follows:  
1. Fifty five percent cited direct and/or daily 
contact between Government and contractor personnel. 
2. Sixty four percent cited receipt and review 
of deliverables. 
3. Twenty seven percent indicate receipt and 
review of Monthly Status Reports (MSRs). 
4. Thirty six percent reference the use of a 
“leader contractor” whom Government personnel interact with 
to manage the contractor workforce.  It was unclear whether 
the “lead contractor” was an individual or a company, 
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charged formally or informally overseeing the other 
contractor(s).  Inputs are excerpted as follows: 
• “COR primarily interacts with contractor Program 
Manager to discuss various tasks needed and priorities.  PM 
then assigns work to contractor personnel.” 
• “I hire a senior contractor support management 
individual who is responsible for organizing activities 
across the subcontractors and among (other contract) 
personnel.  The latter is a bit tricky since there is no 
“official” tie between the different contacting vehicles.” 
• “We have a lead contractor that we interface with 
on each contract awarded.” 
• “In the end, I hold the senior managers from each 
contracting vehicle accountable for meeting the task orders 
and executing their budget with my guidance.” 
5. Twenty seven percent made reference to the 
complication in keeping distinction between Government and 
contractor personnel, due to the workforces being co-
located. 
6. Forty six percent cited the role of the 
Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR): 
A single Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) is 
assigned to be the liaison between the requirements 
generator and the provider (contractor).  The COR is 
the single voice to pass on specific tasks, adjust 
priorities and evaluate performance.  This is 
especially important when the contractor co-exists in 
the same workspace.  Performance is reviewed and 
discussed with the contractor at least annually as 
part of the Contractor Performance Assessment 
Reporting System (CPARS) requirements.  At the end of 
the contract period of performance, (the Directorate) 
has re-evaluated the need for the functions performed 
by the contractor and has reduced the requirement in 
the follow-on solicitation.  
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7. One responded: “I receive a monthly written 
report and we perform an annual performance review.”     
h. How Do You Evaluate the Success of Those 
Services and the Benefit to the Government?  
How Do You Convey That Level of Success to 
the Performer?   
The responses presented little cohesive planning 
or understanding of either a process of evaluating the 
services received or a value in providing ongoing feedback 
to industry.  The exception is cited here: 
COR has various measures for timeliness, accuracy, 
completeness, re-work, level of complexity. Some 
daily, some randomly.   
 
No examples of metrics were offered by the respondent.  
Other comments are excerpted here: 
1. “Through execution of the service as defined 
in the statements of work.” 
2. “Admittedly, this is a very loose process 
with limited metrics.” 
3. “We really don’t.  We take whatever quality 
of product we get and then clean it up to meet our needs.” 
4. “We don’t provide much feedback which causes 
corrective action on the part of the contractor unless 
there are some other issues.” 
5. “…via the issuance of incentive fees.” 
6. “…evaluate success and benefit by being able 
to accomplish our job.” 
7. “Bi-annual or annual evaluations are done on 
the benefit of the services and deliverables provided to 
the Government.” 
8. “Success is based on our ability to get the 
work done on time and that it is of high quality.” 
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9. “Success is conveyed to the contractor 
through the Contractor Performance Appraisal Reporting 
System (CPARS).” 
10. “In cases of special excellence, a letter 
will be drafted to the company, or sometimes, informally 
through email.” 
11. “Feedback is provided to the Contracting 
Specialist and/or Contracting Officer.” 
12. “I simply review the end product to 
ascertain if it meets the requirement or not.” 
13. “As work is submitted, errors are identified 
to the individual contractor.” 
14. “As long as the office is working smoothly, 
there are not major blips on the pulse, the (Government 
management) is happy, then I am satisfied.” 
15. “I do monitor workload and if it appears 
disproportionate I have been known to meet with folks on 
both Government and contractor and discuss how best to fix 
the problems.” 
16. “I am big on feedback and basically feel 
that our contractors do not necessarily get the respect 
they should.  I provide impromptu notes to contractor 
supervisors as to performance.  I believe strongly in 
treating our support folks the way I would like to be 
treated.  I try to set an example so the young contractors 
will learn as they become managers, that respect and 
appreciation gets you much further than criticism and 
negativity.” 
17. “We direct comments to (the COR).  In all 
honesty, we typically only direct complaints.” 
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i. Is There Any Method to Quantify the Return 
on Investment?   
No respondent had any quantifiable method of 
measuring a return on investment, although several 
expressed interest in receiving help in this area.  Several 
offered anecdotal approaches, as follows: 
1. “The contractor reports on tasks 
accomplished and the Government confirms the extent to 
which the service is delivered.  It’s barely parametric.” 
2. “… the smooth running of the (program 
office) is the biggest ROI.  While we cannot “train” our 
contractors, we can give them exposure so they become 
intoned with the office and respected part of the office.” 
3. “We try to get the job done with the least 
cost to the Government, while receiving the best support 
possible.” 
4. “This is either an enhanced product or not.  
It meets specs or does not.” 
5. “In our office, the current contract has 
resulted in a decrease in cost from $2.2M to $1.5M, but 
this might be just a result of contractor buy-in.” 
6. “The work would not get done due to the 
unavailability of (Government personnel). 
7. “When special projects are completed, it is 
not necessary to keep a person employed if they are not 
Government; contractor has to find other work for them 
elsewhere.” 
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j. What Other Experiences Do You Have with 
Contracted Technical Support? (For Example, 
Under What Situations or Through What Types 
of contracts?)  
All respondents had experience with contracted 
technical support and offered a wide range of roles and 
experiences, with examples as follows: 
1. “I have little experience in the area of 
being the customer.  I have a great deal of experience with 
contracts in general, both as Director, and a former 
Contract Specialist.” 
2. “Prime Mission Product contracts delivering 
products to support systems.” 
3. “I had service contracts as the field 
activity before coming here, but I can honestly say I have 
no clue what that vehicle was.” 
4. “The vehicles discussed thus far are the 
same vehicles that were used in my last program office.  
The difference is that in that program office the 
contractor reported to two important metrics, time 
dedicated to function/deliverable (measured to the hour) 
and product deliverable.  These were closely matched on a 
monthly basis.  I have not instituted that level of 
discipline in those program office yet.” 
5. “Been through the gambit of CPFF, FFP, CPIF 
and CPAF.  So far, the CPIF appears to be about the fairest 
from both sides of the track.” 
k. Are You Familiar with Performance Based 
Services Contracts or Multiple Award 
Contracts?  
All respondents claimed familiarity with these 
contracts. 
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l. How Have/Will Either of These Contract 
Methods Effect Program Execution or How You 
Perform Your Job?  
1. Twenty seven percent of respondents 
indicated it was too early in their experience with either 
MACs or PBSA to evaluate the effects 
2. Eighteen percent of respondents stated a 
change to these contract strategies would have no effect on 
the program execution or job performance.  
3. The remainder had mixed opinions on the 
impact of these strategies on program execution or job 
performance, with sample comments below: 
• “Hopefully move us toward treating our contract 
support in a similar manner to what we do with Prime 
Mission Product contractors.” 
• “Our contractors still think and propose level of 
effort, and some of our Government employees still want to 
own their own contractors.” 
• “Culture has not changed.” 
• “I wrote the (PBSA/MAC) tasks for the program 
office.  It was not easy since it was on-the-job training.” 
• “PBSA takes longer because no one is familiar 
with the language and concepts involved – Government or 
contractors proposing.” 
• “It will take a much greater labor effort to 
monitor to ensure that all the performance standards agreed 
to are met – and are incentivized or disincentivized. 
• “Will need additional documentation to record in 
files the various results of monitoring.” 
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• “I believe multiple award contracts will help us 
increase the pool of talent to select from, but will 
require more work on the part of the Government and take a 
lot longer to go from start to award of contract.” 
• “I am not convinced that PBSA will help very much 
in the area of support services.  If a contractor is not 
adequately fulfilling contract requirements, we always had 
the option of not funding them in future years.” 
• “(MACs/PBSA) requires much more Government 
involvement.  It is causing a hardship on the Government 
personnel since some program offices had little involvement 
with prepping SOWs in the past, now they are required to 
prep the PWS and process the contract modifications.” 
• “A major issue is that the contractor personnel 
involved in developing and maintaining spend plans, are 
employees of the companies that bid on the proposals.” 
One respondent was exceptionally articulate in 
conveying an understanding of the question.  Due to the 
clarity of the response, the input is captured here in its 
entirety, with minor redaction to ensure anonymity: 
These methods are preferred for obtaining support 
services – so our new programs will apply the methods 
to the full extent possible.  It definitely impacts 
how we define the requirement and develop the 
acquisition strategy – and once the contracts are 
awarded, our post-award effort is much different. 
 
I’ve already disclosed there is a significant impact 
on my current program – (which) is performance based 
and multiple award.  … I would like to share my 
historical experience with performance based services 
contracts (experience which predates current policy 
emphasis/mandates.)   
 
For literally decades, the (service) has contracted 
for mess attendant services with performance based 
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work statements.  We considered the application of 
performance based contracting in the mess attendant 
environment to be very successful.  We had a very 
clear out put with very predictable requirements – and 
a very structured inspection process. 
 
However, performance based contracting for mess 
attendant services was NEVER touted as a simplified 
approach to constructing an acquisition strategy.  In 
order to define mess attendant services in terms of 
need, our performance work statements were relatively 
brief, BUT THE SOLICITATION CONTAINED EXTENSIVE 
DOCUMENTATION.  In order to provide our offerors with 
sufficient data to quantify the effort, we 
supplemented the solicitation with inches of exhibits.   
Performance based contracting is not an easy method – 
current policies have been blind to how difficult it 
is to define the needed support. 
    
There is a misperception that this approach is 
“streamlined” because you need only describe the 
outcome – a simplistic and naïve outlook.  It is 
damaging to our ability to construct performance-based 
requirements because the policy leads folks to 
conclude development of the procurement request 
package/documentation only requires minimal effort – 
and therefore, minimal staffing.  Wrong!  And the need 
for additional staffing extends through evaluation 
efforts for source selection right out to the 
administration of the contract.   
 
• When performance metrics are imposed – 
SOMEONE must measure SOMETHING.   
• Unless you trivialize that “something” – 
measurements/evaluations of performance are 
demanding efforts. 
 
I also have observed that “quantifying” professional 
efforts is often a misrepresentation of the 
Government’s needs.  Professional support services are 
unlike mess attendant services (which I characterized 
as having traits such as “clear output” and 
predictable requirements.)  Professional support 
services such as engineering services and financial 
management and program management have elements of 
“clear out-put” – but only certain of the requirements 
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are predictable.  I am extremely pessimistic that 
performance based work statements can fairly describe 
such effort.  In my opinion, during contract 
performance either the contractor or the Government 
will suffer significant inequities.   
And applying objective performance measurements to 
very subjective efforts is absurd – clearly, the only 
way such policies can be “successfully” implemented is 
by contortion.  I am not looking forward to the 
convoluted administration required by such naïve 
mandates.”   
 
m. Is There Quantification as to the Effect 
These Contract Methods Has or Will Have on 
Your Program Office? 
1. “Not really, but changing our contracting 
strategy and looking into large scale integration contracts 
will reduce workload for the Government.  Will not then be 
awarding multiple small contracts.” 
2. “Will take longer” 
3. “I would have to look closely, but I do not 
think they are more cost efficient.  They are more time 
consuming and not as easy to work with.  But perhaps, as 
with anything, once we get used to them, it will be 
better.” 
4. “…limited metrics at this point and limited 
experience …” 
5. “MAC has reduced program support from $2.2M 
on a CPIF to $1.5M (FPIF).  Unsure whether this is mostly 
attributable to decreasing scope or contractor buy-in or 
competition.” 
6. “…these new policies have, essentially, a 
100 percent impact the acquisition strategy.  In terms of 
cost, the (PBSA MAC) is hoping for less costly technical 
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support.  I am unaware of the success in this area.  
However, to administer these contracts, the post-award 
staffing has expanded from a full time contract specialist 
and ¾ time contracting officer to:  a full time contracting 
officer, a projected requirement for 5 contract specialists 
to compete and administer the task orders, and a $2M 
support contract  ($1M per year for 2 years) designed to 
assist with development of performance based work 
statements for the task orders.  Although I am unaware of 
the actual cost delta, intuitively it will cost a LOT MORE 
to process competitive task orders and write performance 
based statements of work for the follow-on contract.”  
There was a further “editorial comment” from one 
respondent: 
There is too much dependence on contractors in the 
program office.  They sit in Government spaces, and 
are treated as Government employees.  People forget 
that they are contractors.  They develop close 
relationships, and will try to arrange it so their 
special contractor is always funded.  On the flip 
side, it takes time for a contractor to learn the 
details of certain programs, the program office, 
(service), DoD, etc.  It is not realistic to assume 
that “someone off the street” can come in and take 
over a job that someone else has been doing for years. 
 
2. Industry Respondents 
Completed surveys were received back from industry 
personnel in the following career fields and functions:  
Program Manager, Contracts Manager, Technical Points of 
Contact (TPOC), Proposal Manager, Engineer, Logistician, 
Acquisition Specialist, Business/Finance Manager.  All 
respondents have a role and perspective in providing or 
administering technical support contractor services.   
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Thirty-six percent of those surveyed are in the position to 
commit their company to proposing on MAC and PB contracts, 
43 percent are able to assess the financial and workload 
variance from cost proposals for previous methods of 
contracting, and 57 percent are in direct charge positions, 
with first-hand responsibility in producing Performance 
Based work products.  The population is fairly evenly split 
between large and small businesses.  Questions and 
responses are as follows: 
a. What Extent of Your Business is with Federal 
Government, Specifically with Department of 
Defense?  
The responses unanimously cited a business base 
of 100 percent with the Federal Government, leading the 
author to believe the respondents considered this question 
in terms of their personal experience and business 
component, vice the intended query referencing the entire 
company.   
b. Is Your Company Large or Small Business? 
Fifty seven percent of respondents cited large 
businesses, and 43 percent represented small businesses. 
c. What Types of Technical Support Services Do 
You Provide? (What Functions or in What 
Capacity) 
The number of responses per functional area are as 
follows:   








Business Process Re-engineering 2
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Test and Evaluation 2
Finance Analysis and Support 2
Administrative 2







Organization and Change Management 2
 
d. How is the Decision Made by Government to 
Utilize These Services, to the Extent and 
for the Purposes It Does?  
This question was perceived as inquiry as to why 
the respondent’s company was awarded a contract, vice 
investigating whether the industry representative was aware 
of the Government’s analysis leading to its decision to 
outsource the work.  One respondent answered as intended: 
“Reductions in Government manning levels have forced 
many agencies to leverage commercial support to ensure 
mission accomplishment.  Additionally, the contractors can 
be shared across tasks and departments, while it is often 
difficult to ‘share’ Government employees.” 
e. What are the Differences Between Government 
and Industry Work Product?  
Thirty six percent of respondents indicated an 
awareness of the distinction in Government and industry 
roles, as demonstrated below:  
“The only significant difference … should be that 
the contractor prepares draft and recommends options, while 
the Government approves final products and directs.” 
  45
“Government provides Program Management 
oversight, whereas our industry work product is a 
capability developed…based on the requirements…” 
The remainder is represented here: 
1. “Government has more specific requirements 
and regulations that require compliance.  
2. “…they are pretty much the same.” 
3. “We have additional work products that have 
to do with running our business, things like utilization 
reports, financial statements, etc.” 
4. “…differences in the allowed processes and 
policies which exist within the particular client.” 
5. “Industry expects more compliance with 
industry standards.” 
6. “Government rules and regulations may be 
stricter in certain areas, where they may be lax in others 
based on non-Government industry clientele.” (NOTE: this 
respondent previously indicated 100 percent of the business 
base is with the Federal Government) 
7. “Should not be noticeable differences.” 
8. “Competition causes industry to hold itself 
to a higher performance level as measured through various 
certifications.”  
f. What Government Process are You Aware of to 
Re-examine the Need and Usage for Your 
Services? 
Respondents were evenly split as to whether the 
Government conducted a viable analysis and process to  
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determine the need to outsource work.  Samples of those who 
reported a lack of premeditated approach are excerpted as 
follows: 
1. “We are not aware with any formal process.” 
2. “Government appears to be very inept in 
truly addressing its needs.” 
3. “Rather than a focused study on needs that 
is prepared, challenged, reconciled, accepted and then 
implemented, Government employees tend to make decisions 
based on best guesses/intuitions without any real regard to 
actual work flow.”  
4. “The process used is in selling services to 
alleviate issues felt by the Government.” 
5. “…a recent (example) noted a 265 MY effort 
that was to be reduced to 185 MY, however, there appeared 
to be no justification to the 185 – except that it was 
about a 40 percent reduction in overall contractor 
support.” 
The following represents those who felt they were 
aware of a proactive evaluation process: 
1. “The very nature of Government contracting 
prompts the Government to reevaluate its method of 
obtaining professional services every few years.” 
2. “Budget reductions force Government program 
managers to reevaluate requirements at least annually.” 
3. “The introduction of PBSA has caused the 
Government to reexamine its processes for contracting for 
professional services, but reductions in Government 
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staffing make the use of contractor support a necessity 
rather than a nice-to-have.” 
4. “The Government evaluates the need for our 
services each FY as part of the budget/resource allocation 
process – often making reductions.” 
5. “The Government routinely examines and re-
examines the need and usage for new capabilities.  This is 
performed in a variety of ways.  The Operational Forces 
provide review and requirements to the Dept of Defense 
Program management Offices.  The Program Managers use 
processes such as the QDR, to review current requirements 
and establish new requirements.  These requirements are 
continuously under review and prioritized for funding.  
These requirements are formulated into funded 
programs/projects that ultimately meet the Operational 
Forces needs.  We support the Operational Forces with 
capabilities that meet their needs, via the Program/Project 
Managers direction.” 
g. How Do You Interact with the Pertinent 
Government Personnel and Provide the 
Specified Services And Deliverables?  
Seventy one percent of the respondents were able 
to articulate a pattern of Government/industry interaction.   
“…personnel work directly with/for the Government 
personnel to provide specified services and deliverables.” 
“Our interaction with the Government personnel 
occurs daily, weekly, monthly, depending on customers 
needs.” 
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We work very closely with the Government 
personnel to ensure proper direction on all of our tasking 
on a regular basis.” 
“We routinely and frequently visit the Government 
personnel to report status and obtain direction 
concurrence.” 
We provide monthly status reports to summarize 
the various interactions, progress on the various tasks.” 
“Most of the work is involved with fulfilling 
items within a work statement or found during the execution 
of a gap analysis.  Communication of this effort is either 
in written or verbal form, explicit directions are provided 
through contracting vehicles to increase scope or through 
email communications to track understanding of 
requirements.” 
“As a task manager I work with clients directly 
to determine needs, required capabilities of staff and so 
on.” 
“Interaction is done on a daily basis for task 
coordination; weekly meetings for task status reporting; 
monthly reports for contracts progress and milestones 
status.  Deliverables are submitted on the required due 
dates, and are followed up to ensure that they have indeed 
met the specifications for those deliverables and to the 
satisfaction of the clients.” 
“Specified services are identified in either a 
SOW or a Work Statement (WS) to which we execute cost, 
schedule, performance elements.  Interaction with 
Government personnel is dependent upon contract 
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requirements and personal preferences.  Some Government 
managers manage/direct at the macro level and some at the 
micro level.  Some provide very little guidance and 
supervision, and some are real nitpickers.  It depends.  It 
also depends on whether the Government manager processes 
information verbally or in writing.  If verbally, then 
daily phone conversations are best; if in writing, then 
memos/emails.” 
h. How Do You Evaluate the Success of Those 
Services and the Benefit to the Government?  
1. Seventy one percent of the respondents 
identified either subjective self-evaluations, or vague or 
undefined objective methods: 
“We work with the Government to review our 
efforts on a regular basis.  Additionally, one of our goals 
is to keep lines of communication open.  The company 
attitude is that our clients’ problems are our problems, 
which helps us to work with our clients as teammates.” 
“… an internal review process to monitor 
performance on an ongoing basis at several levels, up to 
and including the firms partners.” 
“As part of our Quality Assurance program, we 
regularly visit our Government customers and obtain 
feedback.” 
“… we do a self-evaluation to ensure our services 
and deliverables are of optimum benefit to the Government.  
As the opportunity presents itself we obtain feedback from 
the ultimate Government customers, the Operational User.” 
“The best way is to stay close to the client, ask 
questions and observe.” 
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2. The remainder of respondents offered 
increasingly objective methods: 
“The success of those services and the benefit to 
the Government are determined by the value that our 
services have contributed, the return on investments that 
we have been able to contribute, the cost savings and cost 
avoidance that our services and solutions have provided, 
the efficiency that our services and products have been 
able to generate, and the tools that have helped and led 
the clients to achieve and accomplish other successfully 
solutions.” 
“A lagging indicator would be Award Fee scores 
and the like.” 
“Success is measured by a number of different 
methods; where at all possible, metrics and benchmarks are 
used to gauge success based upon program 
specifications/parameters.  Pockets of Government are very 
good in identifying specifications/parameters that signal 
program success.  Specifically, these areas are usually 
hardware related, and related to weapon systems.  Other 
softer areas of Government also provide specific guidance 
for what denotes success.  For example, if preparing a 
product such as a curriculum development effort where some 
sort of web-based Interactive Media Instruction (IMI), the 
success criteria is rather simple – it works or it doesn’t, 
it responds within the timeframe allotted or it does not.  
Staff augmentation services are a bit more difficult to 
gauge since benchmarks are specific to each office, but may 
not reflect the needs of an office. For example, for 
receptionist support, it may be the number of phone calls 
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answered by the fourth ring; for an INFOSEC engineer, it 
may be the number of C&As prepared within a specified 
timeframe.”  
i. How Does Government Convey That Level of 
Success to You as the Performer?  
1. Thirty six percent of respondents indicated 
frequent proactive feedback from the Government.  
2. The remainder cited regular formal feedback 
methods, such as CPARs, Award Fee or Award Term incentives, 
in addition to industry-initiated contact and interviews. 
3. One respondent opined success is measured 
by, “… recommendations and referrals to other prospective 
clients, …and follow-on contract awards” 
4. One respondent offered, “test plans, 
testing, and test reports convey quantitative success in an 
objective manner.”     
j. What Other Experiences do You Have with 
Providing Contracted Technical Support?  
(For Example, Under What Situations or 
Through What Types of Contracts?)  
The respondents identified themselves as both 
prime and subcontractors with the Government and with 
commercial contracts.  Performance was executed under 
various GSA schedules, Time and Material, IDIQ, FFPIF, CP 
vehicles.  
k. Are You Familiar with Performance Based 
Services Contracts or Multiple Award 
Contracts?   
All respondents answered in the affirmative, with 
two inputs of particular note: 
“Yes….regretfully.” 
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“Yes.  Government has moved more and more to 
these vehicles.  While MAC IDIQs provide Government with a 
small pool of trusted vendors to provide a focused 
service/product, vendors note that they increase costs 
since specific efforts are now competed on an individual 
basis.” 
l. How Have/Will Either of These Contract 
Methods Effect Your Decisions on What Tasks 
to Compete for or How You Perform Your Job?   
l. Sixty four percent of the respondents 
expected an overall positive effect to the Government as a 
result of PBSA or MACs, synopsized below: 
• “While there should be minimal change in bid/no 
bid decisions, the use of PBSA forces contractors to take a 
harder look at requirements when preparing bids as the risk 
shifts further toward the contractor.” 
• “These contract methods are easily implemented 
and have no effect on the decision to bid or no bid the 
contract.  The decisions are made based on research into 
the competition and the fit within our strategic focus.” 
• “Job performance is pretty much the same.  Do 
great work.  But now there is a built in feedback for this 
and a way of focusing our efforts.” 
• “Both PBSC and MAC seem to be the future choices 
of the Federal Government/DoD acquisition process.  To 
remain in the Federal Government and DoD markets, we 
believe that our firm must perform well in both of these 
types of contract methods, to strive for excellence in both 
of these scenarios, and to maintain consistency in 
performance excellence.”  
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• “Both these contracts require that we must be 
flexible, adaptive, responsive, and maintain a streamlined 
cost structure.” 
• “To be successful in either one of these 
contracts, our cost structure must be continuously lean to 
ensure that we remain competitive on all competitive tasks 
and to ensure that can attain options or award terms.” 
2. Thirty six percent of respondents presented a 
cautionary note, represented in the two comments which 
follow: 
Multiple Award Performance Based Services 
Contracts will have a significant affect on our decision to 
compete for tasks.  In particular, if the contract has 
special caveats that make it effectively a non-competitive 
environment that allows for most of the tasking to be sole 
sourced to one company, there is no opportunity to bid on 
the task.  This is not multiple award!  In the limited 
cases (~10 percent) where the opportunity exists to compete 
for tasks it is highly questionable that it makes any sense 
to spend B&P to bid on a task that will be routinely be 
awarded to the majority incumbent.  Our experience to date 
with MACs is that it is a mechanism for the Government to 
get access to the incumbent and to use the other awardees 
as pawns to lower the price.  We will give serious 
consideration as to whether we continue to bid on these 
kinds of contracts that highly favor the incumbent.  In 
addition, the additional cost for bidding on individual 
tasks is an added cost to the contractor as well as to the 
Government.  The ROI doesn’t exist! 
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Many in Government do not feel secure enough in their 
position to accept true performance based work 
efforts, nor do they want to.  The status quo works 
fine and provides a belly button that can be pressed 
when needed.  Consequently, at this point, 
performance-based is a feel-good attitude that 
Government is approaching private industry efficiency, 
but it is not.  MACs are now a part of the landscape.  
If you want to play, then you need to participate, 
even though you may be nothing from them. 
 
m. Is There Quantification as to the Effect 
These Contract Methods Have or Will Have on 
Your Company?   
Responses ranged from a succinct, “Yes”, to “not 
that I have seen”, with samples reflected below: 
1. “We work in the PB environment by default 
for our company, so this method has no effect.” 
2. “While the company certainly has the 
capability to go after a number of MACs based on corporate 
capabilities, an honest assessment is made of just what the 
company can expect to receive in revenue from a specific 
vehicle.  Depending upon the cost of entry, the need for 
the vehicle, and many other factors (current customer? 
Specified targeted customer?), the company may elect to 
pursue or not pursue.  It depends.” 
3. “Since most of our revenues are based on 
Federal and DoD contracts, the continuing focus and 
directions of the Federal Government and DoD to apply these 
contract methods would have a significant importance to our 
organization.  By continuing to exceed our clients 
expectation, deliver valued solutions that would contribute 
to ROI, cost saving, cost avoidance, and efficiency 
improvement, we could ensure our future successes.” 
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4. “This method of contracting can be very 
effective if properly implemented.  It truly can be a way 
of getting best value.” 
5. “These types of contracts are not always 
properly implemented.  The true effect of these contracts 
is that many of our employees have been hired into other 
companies that had a larger incumbent alignment for the 
tasks.  Incumbency wins!  The real harm is for the 
employees that are forced to lose their hard earned 
benefits by having to take a job with a different company 
only to be put on the same job they were doing before the 
task award.  The harm to the Government is that they have 
to pay more for those employees (services) that move to a 
different company in order to salvage their job.  The ROI 
doesn’t exist.” 
 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter decomposed the demographics of the survey 
respondent population, by role and by function.  It also 
recorded the verbatim inputs of these respondents and 
tracked the statistical representations of any common 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION   
This chapter goes more deeply into the survey 
responses, drawing comparisons between the two respondent 
populations and to the knowledge base gained from the 
literature research.  The author sought out areas of 
omission, as well as conflict or affirmation of statements 
between the groups. 
B. SURVEY RESULTS 
As presented in Chapter IV, the survey and responses 
offer insights into the thoughts and impressions of the 
representative population. The respondent grouping, 
consisting of 22 Government and 14 industry inputs, was too 
small to offer statistical significance; however, there 
were indicators as to behavior and biases to capture 
interest.  These are presented below:  
1. Government Respondents 
a. How Is the Decision Made by Government to 
Utilize These Services, to the Extent and 
for the Purposes It Does? 
On the methodology leading to the decision to 
utilize contractor support services, the largest grouping 
of responses cited augmentation of the Government 
workforce.  Slightly more than one third cited credible 
analysis and quantification substantiating the decision, 
with 27 percent indicating such contracting was a result of 
inertia from long-standing office or program policy.   
b. What Are the Differences Between Government 
and Industry Work Product? 
It was positively recognized by the author that 
45 percent of respondents indicated an awareness of 
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inherently Government responsibilities.  It is, however, 
noted that at least one respondent cited a scenario wherein 
contractors “…appear to be acting as Government personnel.”    
c. What Is the Process and Frequency to Re-
Examine the Need and Usage for Contractors? 
In an apparent contradiction to the inputs to 
question (a) above, 82 percent of respondents indicate a 
review is conducted at least annually to assess the need 
for contractor support.   
d. How Do You Obtain Contractor Support?  
The response quoted on this question presented 
personal observation that Government personnel used 
technical services support contracts to “…get to 
individuals that they wanted on the technical team.”  This 
is contrary to the premise of PBSA, wherein the Government 
articulates its requirements, then allows the contractor to 
satisfy that requirement however and with whomever it 
chooses, and in turn is measured on its success according 
to agreed upon criteria.  This input epitomizes one of the 
biggest challenges with PBSA and MACs, which is the 
necessity of decoupling the dispassionate process, and 
allowing a requirements-driven competition, from the human 
aspects.  
e. How Do You Evaluate the Success of Those 
Services and the Benefit to the Government?  
How Do You Convey That Level of Success to 
the Performer?  
As described earlier, it is critical that the 
Government establish clear criteria, which is reflected in 
a formal quality assurance program, by which to measure 
performance.  The responses present little evidence that 
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there is, in actuality, an appropriate degree of evaluation 
and feedback necessary to adequately execute PBSA.   
f. Is There Any Method to Quantify the Return 
on Investment?  
The respondents reported no metrics or clear 
analysis as to the value of using program resources for 
contracted technical support services. This presents a 
disconnect from the tenets of the National Performance 
Review and resulting acquisition reform, as described in 
Chapter II, which include the goal of achieving more 
effective outcomes from the processes, and metrics to 
measure those outcomes.  
g. How Have/Will Either of (PBSA or MACs) 
Effect Program Execution or How You Perform 
Your Job?  
Eighteen percent indicated “no effect on the 
program execution or job performance”. 
One comment introduced the challenge of 
Organizational Conflict of Interest, in that “contractor 
personnel involved in developing and maintaining spend 
plans are employees of the companies that bid on the 
proposals.”   
One articulate respondent details the difficulty 
and amount of effort involved with PBSA for mess attendant 
services, a requirement with “very predictable requirements 
and very structured inspection process.”  Having the prior 
experience with an environment which lends itself to PBSA, 
the respondent continues with much pessimism as to the 
success of “…applying objective performance measurements to 
very subjective efforts…” in using PBSA for professional 
support services.  
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h. Is There Quantification as to the Effect 
These Contract Methods Have or Will Have on 
Your Program Office?  
The responses were conflicting, from the vague 
“…will reduce workload for the Government…” and “…will take 
longer, to “…do not think they are more cost efficient…” to 
reference of a 68 percent cost reduction for contracted 
program support. 
The more discrete input cited a 71 percent 
staffing increase, augmented with a $2M support contract, 
for PBSA MAC post-award contract administration.  
2.  Industry Respondents 
a. How Is the Decision Made by Government to 
Utilize These Services, to the Extent and 
for the Purposes It Does?  
While Government respondents interpreted this 
question as it was intended, industry respondents almost 
universally interpreted it as inquiry as to why the 
respondent’s company was awarded a contract, vice 
investigating whether the industry representative was aware 
of the Government’s analysis leading to its decision to 
outsource the work.  
b. What are the Differences Between Government 
and Industry Work Product? 
Where 45 percent of Government respondents 
indicated an awareness of inherently Government 
responsibilities, 36 percent of industry respondents 
demonstrated the same cognizance.  There was no reference 
or acknowledgement from industry as to contractors who 
“…appear to be acting as Government personnel”, as found in 
the Government respondent input.  Due to the relatively 
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small sample population, there is no statistical 
significance in the variance.    
c. What Government Process are You Aware of to 
Re-examine the Need and Usage for Your 
Services? 
Industry inputs were evenly split as to whether 
this occurred, as opposed to 82 percent of the Government 
respondents who reported a review is conducted at least 
annually to assess the need for contractor support.  The 
majority of those who responded in the affirmative 
referenced an annual review, as did the Government 
respondents.  The words “inept” and “best 
guesses/intuitions” are of note.  The one input that cited 
measurable and specific reductions, which might indicate a 
clear methodology, is then derailed in that there was “…no 
justification…except that it as about a 40 percent 
reduction…”.  
d. How Do You Evaluate the Success of Those 
Services and the Benefit to the Government?  
How Does the Government Convey That Level of 
Success to You as the Performer?  
Chapter II discussed the need for Government to 
clearly articulate what it wants and expects as a result of 
the contract.  Seventy-one percent of industry respondents 
reported they measure their success by subjective self-
evaluation, or vague or undefined objective methods.  There 
was one reference to a “Quality Assurance Program”, which 
appeared to indicate a corporate program vice a formal 
Quality Assurance Plan within a PBSA contract or task. 
Industry respondents did not articulate the same 
conflict in behavior between prescribed strategy and actual  
execution that the Government respondents indicated.  In 
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view of the obvious candor of the inputs, this absence is 
of interest.  
e. How Have/Will Either of (PBSA Or MACs) 
Effect Your Decisions on What Tasks to 
Compete for or How You Perform Your Job?  
Sixty four percent of industry expected an 
overall positive effect resulting from PBSA or MACs, where 
27 percent of Government respondents indicated it was too 
early to evaluate the effects of MACs or PBSA and 18 
percent anticipated no change. 
One dissenting comment echoed a Government 
observation that some offices use the facade of a MAC to 
still obtain the services of a preferred contractor. None 
made reference to the challenge of Organizational Conflict 
of Interest. 
The quote cited in the previous chapter stated, 
“…it is highly questionable that it makes any sense to 
spend B&P to bid on a task that will be routinely be 
awarded to the majority incumbent.”  This is the only 
reference to the impact these contracting strategies have 
on the overhead and costs of industry when competing for 
potential Government contracts.      
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the survey inputs and identified 
statistical occurrences, conflicts and gaps in the 
responses.  A conflict would be the result of opposing or 
significantly differing observations from the two 
respondent populations.  One possible explanation is 
inadequate communication as to the subject matter or 
process.  A parallel explanation is cognitive dissonance, 
which should be recognized and might be readily corrected.  
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A gap indicates a more significant problem, in that neither 
group recognized or interpreted a subject matter that could 
reasonably be expected to be known or understood.  The 
absence of reference to surveillance and enforcement of 
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VI. CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter documents the recent contracting strategy 
of an Echelon Acquisition Command.  Three stages are 
discussed: traditional range of functional and 
organizational contracts, which address specified needs and 
requirements; a Command-wide omnibus strategy; and the 
current move into the mandated PBSA and MAC environment.  
B. PREFACE 
 In the late 1990’s, Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command (SPAWAR) was recovering from a bi-coastal 
relocation, from Arlington, VA to San Diego, CA due to the 
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) effort.  By the 
completion of the relocation in 1997, the headquarters 
organization had experienced an approximated 75 percent 
turnover in personnel.  At that time, SPAWAR was 
functionally organized as depicted below: 
Figure 7.   SPAWAR Organization Chart, circa 1997 
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As the organization settled into its new environment, 
there was a growing awareness of and effort to seek out 
potentials to achieve some efficiencies and cost savings. 
Externally, there were pressures to re-engineer business 
processes and to focus aggressively trace all efforts and 
resources to supporting the warfighter, and shed those 
efforts which might be outdated or detracting from the 
maximum value to the mission.  While SPAWAR, as most 
Department of Navy organizations, was clearly focused on 
its mission, it was recognized there was timely opportunity 
to revamp its approach to acquiring the technical support 
services necessary to execute that mission.  That set the 
stage to introduce a new approach to providing technical 
support services to the SPAWAR program offices.  At that 
time, the Command initially identified 47 existing services 
contracts, valued at over $1.4B, which brought system 
engineering, test and evaluation, installation support, and 
integrated logistics support to assist in acquisition and 
execution for C4ISR programs.  It was suspected that 
efficiencies would be gained with a reduction of the number 
of overlapping scopes of these contracts.  A reduced number 
of contracts intuitively would also mean a reduction in 
management overhead and expense paid to the multitude of 
companies.  The 47 contracts initially under consideration 
were narrowed down to 17, due to pre-existing conditions 
such as 8(a) set-asides, classified program status, or 
other limitations that precluded inclusion in the eventual 
effort. 
At that time, the organization identified its mission 
as: 
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To provide Naval Commanders a decisive warfare 
advantage through the development, acquisition and life 
cycle management of effective and responsive:  
Battle Management Systems:   
• Software Applications, computers, and 
displays Undersea, Terrestrial and space 
sensors 
• Satellites, underwater Sensor Arrays, 
Navigation, and Weather Systems 
Information Management Systems: 
• Communications Systems, Radios, Satellite 
Ground Stations, Antennas, and Switches 
• Infrastructure (LANs, Routers, Hubs), and 
Non-Tactical Software” 
The stated intent was to establish and 
institutionalize disciplined engineering, business, 
financial, and human resource processes that would sustain 
the organization over time.  It was recognized as an 
underlying premise, that an efficient organization is the 
one that follows the flow of the money; misaligned lines of 
responsibility, accountability, authority and dollar flow 
lead to chaos. 
The external Department of Defense operating 
environment mandated a reduced shore infrastructure 
migration to regionalization efforts and services, “buying 
back” a negative wedge; and promoting paperless 
acquisition.  Much of these initiatives were set forth in 
the CNO’s SEA Enterprise, which identified at $10B 
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shortfall, the “negative wedge”, to re-capitalize the Navy 
Warfighter infrastructure. 
Internally, SPAWAR’s environment presented too many 
contracts and delivery orders; a legacy of duplicative 
contracts; high operation and administration costs; 
pressure to reduce acquisition lead-time; stovepipe 
operations in both Government and industry.  The post-BRAC 
organization resulted in a Contracts Directorate with a 44 
percent increase in workload and a 15 percent reduction in 
personnel, with employees working over 450 hours of 
uncompensated overtime a month.   Feedback from industry at 
that time was that the processes were “wasteful”; technical 
code feedback deemed it unmanageable. 
The conflux of external pressures discussed in the 
previous chapter, internal environment, and various 
feedback lead to the awareness that, as several large 
technical support services contracts would be nearing 
expiration, the Command was presented with an opportunity 
to re-engineer its processes.  The essence of this 
opportunity became a challenge to consolidate the service 
contracts while supporting small business.  The goals could 
be stated as:  Minimize costs, administration, and 
management oversight, while maximizing leverage and 
technical control. 
C. USE OF CONTRACT SUPPORT 
At this point, it is useful to review the fundamental 
reasons for using contracted technical support services.  
The majority of such usage falls into two categories: the 
need to reach beyond the Government ranks for specific, 
often highly technical expertise, and to augment a 
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downsizing Government workforce.  SPAWAR, like most other 
acquisition commands, uses this “third workforce” in 
addition to civilian and military for both reasons.  The 
benefits are clear: With contractor employees, the 
Government does not assume the responsibility of management 
and personnel, which are inherent with its own workforce.  
A contracted workforce is engaged for a particular period 
of time and specific tasks; when that time or task is 
complete, the Government has no burden of reassigning or 
reallocating the employees, which it must do with civil 
servants and military.  When there is a surge effort, the 
Government does not face the hurdle or delay of complying 
with civil service rules when it tasks industry to perform 
the work.  Finally, Government can turn to industry to 
readily satisfy a need for a fluctuating labor mix, rather 
than incur the expense of reassigning and retraining its 
own workforce.  Also important is the shifting to industry 
management the compliance with labor, health, and 
administrative laws and regulations for their personnel. 
When considering the expense of in-house Government 
employees vice the contracted workforce, it is important to 
realize it is not merely a matter of a GS salary vice the 
contracted fully burdened (direct and indirect expenses) 
work year.  When calculating the cost of in-house 
Government civilian labor costs, OMB Circular A-76 (which 
falls under the auspices of competitive sourcing) includes 
retirement, life and health insurance, and annual and sick 
leave benefits.  The costs do not acknowledge Government’s 
indirect expenses such as training, education, legal, IT 
equipment and support, legal, and other administrative 
support, which are necessary to sustain a workforce.  This 
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draws to the conclusion that a “dollar-to-dollar” 
comparison, which would present a contracted workforce as 
more expensive than the Government workforce, is faulty in 
that it does not take all expenses into consideration. 
D. CONTRACT STRATEGY 
As stated, a major goal of SPAWAR’s corporate 
contracting strategy was to reduce the number of support 
service contracts in place.  Additionally, as part of the 
Strategic Source, Business Process Re-Engineering efforts, 
SPAWAR was seeking a command-wide contract for processes 
common to all Program Managers.  Finally, the SPAWAR goal 
was to award a contract that would provide a substantial 
amount of work to the small business community and enable 
technical growth of small businesses.  Accordingly, the 
command established the strategy for “Program Management 
Team Omnibus” (PMTO).  Seventeen cost reimbursable type 
contracts for command-wide program management and 
engineering type services were replaced.  The value of 
these 17 contracts was $453,716,142 over the entire periods 
covered by the contracts (up to five years). 
This acquisition strategy was to conduct a full and 
open competitive procurement resulting in cost plus award 
fee non-personal services contracts.  The acquisition was 
designed to improve the quality of services; save high 
operation and administration costs; shorten acquisition 
lead-time; consolidate requirements to eliminate stovepipe 
operations, and establish common processes across the 
command.  PMTO represented SPAWAR’s first contracting 
effort to manage command-wide operations and support 
services.  The way to obtain these advantages and receive 
the best value for the Navy was to conduct a procurement 
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that would result in award(s) to a single team of 
contractors after maximum full and open competition. 
In order to mesh with the business practices of the 
organization, the Request for Proposal (RFP) was premised 
on the Command’s Business Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), 
which is shown here: 
 
Figure 8.   SPAWAR Business Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), 
of 1999 
 
The PMTO service contracts replicated the WBS by 
covering five major categories of support: (1) Project 
Management; (2) Systems Engineering; (3) System Test and 
Evaluation; (4) Site Platform Installation; and (5) 
Integrated Logistics Support. 
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Figure 9.   PMTO Work Breakdown Structure 
 
Each category had a prime contractor, working under 
the auspices of a lead prime contractor. 
This strategy produce a “Team” contracting approach 
intended to give SPAWAR technical leverage in dealing with 
one lead prime contractor exercising program management 
oversight over its team members.  Such technical leverage 
would result in cost efficiencies command-wide.  The “team” 
approach represented an acquisition streamlining initiative 
to minimize the quantity of contracts and maximize small, 
small disadvantaged, and small woman-owned business 
participation in SPAWAR support services.  SPAWAR’s goal 
was to award 50 percent of the total value to small, small 
disadvantaged, and/or small woman-owned business concerns.  
This goal included both prime and subcontractors offered by 
the winning “team”.  As approved by SPAWAR’s Small Business 
representative, the primary Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code in place at that time for this 
effort was 8711 (Engineering Services) applied to each of 
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the prime contractor awards issued under this procurement.  
Code 8711 permitted up to a $20M average annual receipt 
size standard to qualify as small business prime 
contractors. 
There were no restrictions as to what size company 
could bid as the team lead.  A small business with any SIC 
code could bid as the team lead, but if such a company bid 
and was not a SIC 8711 sized business, the work would not 
count as credit toward the SPAWAR small business goal. 
E. COMPETITION 
This strategy maximized full and open competition at 
the outset.  PMTO invited companies to establish “teaming” 
arrangements among large and small/small disadvantaged 
businesses.  At the close of the solicitation, three 
“teams” competed.  Each competing team was led by a team 
leader (all of which were large businesses) with up to four 
team members (all team members were small businesses).  
Overall, more than 150 companies participated in this 
highly competitive procurement either as a Team Leader/Team 
Member prime contractor or as a subcontractor to one of the 
“teams”.  SPAWAR’s goal of awarding a team of contracts 
with more than 50 percent small business representation was 
achieved.  By obtaining full and open competition at the 
outset, the best value to the Navy was obtained from both a 
cost and performance perspective. 
F. CONTRACT TYPE 
This brief discussion of the contract type is provided 
to complete the understanding of the background of the PMTO 
and the construct under which industry and the organization 
have functioned for the past five years. 
  74
A full and open competitive, Cost Plus Award Fee 
(CPAF), “C” Type contract was determined to represent the 
best alternative for PMTO.  This was the best choice to 
streamline processes during the pre-award and post-award 
phases. 
Given the innovate nature of PMTO, SPAWAR was “unable 
to estimate costs with sufficient accuracy to use any type 
of fixed price contract.” 11  Specifically, the PMTO 
concept, and its inherent considerations, had never been 
previously contracted for by SPAWAR.  Since fixed price 
contracts require accurate estimates and a definite scope, 
the PMTO procurement could not be obtained using this 
methodology.  As such, a Fixed-Price contract was not 
selected due to the uncertainties associated with the 
overall scope of work and the fluctuation of work products.  
After extensive research, it was determined that a Cost 
Reimbursable environment best suited this acquisition.  
This would result in the best value to the Government.  A 
Level of Effort (LOE) cost-reimbursable contract (with an 
estimated number of labor hours) best captured the PMTO 
needs of SPAWAR.  Work would be identified to the 
contractor(s) via Technical Direction Letters (TDLs). 
A CPAF “C” contract type was selected given the 
uncertainties involved in contract performance and SPAWAR’s 
desire to obtain the highest quality services while 
motivating the contracts to manage their resources and 
costs well.  As stated in the FAR, contracts with Award Fee 
provisions should provide “an award amount that the 
contractor may earn in whole or in part during performance 
                     
11 FAR 16.301-2 
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that is sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in 
such areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity and 
cost effective management.”  This CPAF definition met 
SPAWAR’s contracting goals for PMTO.  Additionally, the 
award fee evaluation criteria included an assessment of the 
relationships between the Team Leader and the Team Members.  
The Team’s accomplishments would be evaluated by their 
ability to enhance total contract performance with regard 
to reducing expenses, creating efficiencies, creating 
common processes across the command and promoting 
coordination among the team members.   
The award fee would be determined based upon a 
combination of the contractor’s performance on individual 
TDLs as well as the contractor’s performance as a member of 
the PMTO team.  An Award Fee Board would determine the 
award fee quarterly, based on a subjective evaluation. 
In 1999, an IDIQ contract scenario with multiple 
awards was not considered suitable for this streamlining 
initiative.   By their very nature, multiple awards would 
require competition for each and every task identified. If 
more than one firm received orders for the same or similar 
work over the source of competing tasks, different work 
products (formats, styles, approaches, etc.) would be 
received command-wide.  IDIQ multiple awards would not 
allow SPAWAR to eliminate stovepipe operations and 
establish command-wide common processes for program 
management services. 
Additionally, the IDIQ type of procurement would 
require a minimum and an estimated maximum dollar amount 
for each of the contracts awarded under the team concept.  
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These minimums and maximums could not be accurately 
estimated at the time of solicitation issuance since the 
PMTO concept had never been previously contracted for by 
SPAWAR. 
G. CONTRACT STRATEGY RESULT 
Pursuant to the terms of the solicitation, this highly 
competitive procurement resulted in the award of prime 
contracts to the team representing the best value to the 
Government.  Five prime contracts awards were made to “Team 
Booz-Allen Hamilton” on 2 September 1999. 
Booz-Allen Hamilton (BAH) was the Team Leader and 
received the contract for Program Management services.  
Maxim, a small business team member, was awarded a contract 
for Systems Engineering.  Systems Planning and Analysis, a 
small business concern, received the award for Systems Test 
and Evaluation.  Site/platform installation was awarded to 
AMRON Corporation, a small business concern.  Finally, 
Systems Integration & Research, another small business, won 
the award for Integrated Logistics Support. 
The overall value of the base-year awards to Team BAH 
was $48.1M for 1.2 million man-hours of effort.  The 
separate contracts each contained four one-year options, 
which, if exercised, would bring the combined cumulative 
values of the awards to $251M.  Due to several factors over 
the past five years, there have been cost growths to the 
original contract awards.  Most significantly, there was a 
significant and unexpected increase in the demand for 
program management support services during FY 02 and FY 03 
at SPAWAR as a result of the organization becoming 
responsible for two programs, the Navy/Marine Corps 
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Intranet (NMCI) and the Defense Integrated Military Human 
Resources Systems (DIMHRS).  These two programs alone 
resulted in the tasking of over 200,000 hours in FY 03, 
almost 40 percent of the 525,000 man-hours originally 
allocated to FY 03.  
H. CONTRACT TEAM LEADER 
One of the most notable aspects of the PMTO concept 
was the assignment of a contractor Team Lead.  This was an 
untested approach for SPAWAR, which effectively shifted 
significant management and administrative aspects from 
Government to industry.  Prior to PMTO, the program offices 
relied on numerous contracting officers to assist in 
contracting for technical support services.  Government 
employees performed or oversaw the placement and execution 
of a multitude of contracts, often with very similar in 
statement of work.  It was not unusual for informal 
competition within industry for day-to-day tasking to 
result, resulting in programmatic inefficiency, the least 
of which would be a lack of communication and support 
between the companies and efforts to gain competitive 
advantage.  When the PMTO was devised, a contractor Team 
Leader was fundamental to the concept.  This shifted a 
significant amount of administrative and management burden 
from Government to industry, and forced collaboration among 
the prime contract holders to the considerable benefit of 
the Government.  There were numerous examples of the 
advantage of this structure, one of which is cited here.  
The Team Lead, BAH, developed and maintained an electronic 
commerce site, used by all five contract holders and their 
subcontractors, along with the Government task owners and 
administrators.  Each Task Order was initiated through this 
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site, with minimal amount of data entry required.  Once 
entered, the system assigned various accounting and 
contractual information, such as the next available ACRN or 
SLIN, and provided a quick-look as the document 
electronically progressed through its processing.  This 
system greatly reduced accounting errors and the time and 
effort usually involved in manually tracking the document.  
The system was also a repository for contractual documents, 
along with templates, guidance, contact points, and the 
like, all contributing to a highly manageable and dynamic 
program.  It would have had a positive workload impact for 
just the one contract held by BAH; when this also 
encompassed the rest of the PMTO team, there were 
considerable benefits. 
I. POST-PMTO ENVIRONMENT 
Since the advent of the PMTO contracts in September 
1999, the structure and mission of the SPAWAR organization 
further evolved, most notably with the establishment of PEO 
C4I and Space.  The current organizations, along with their 
affiliated organizations, PEO-IT, PEO(T), NMCI, PEO-LMW, 
and Echelon III Commands, are responsible for the 
architecture, integration, acquisition, and support of 
integrated and interoperable information solutions to 
support the national defense and the delivery of specific 
systems.  These organizations also provide robust space and 
C4I capabilities to the Fleet and the Nation, providing 
SATCOM capabilities and partnering with the National 
Reconnaissance Office.  In addition, SPAWAR is the Navy C4I 
Chief Engineer and the FORCEnet Chief Engineer.  The 
mission of SPAWAR is to enable knowledge superiority to the 
war fighter through the development, acquisition, and life 
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cycle support of effective, capable, and integrated C4ISR, 
IT, and space systems.  The mission of PEO-C4I and Space is 
similar; to acquire, integrate, deliver, and support 
interoperable C4I & Space systems enabling seamless 
operations for the fleet, joint, and coalition war fighter.  
The current organizations are depicted below: 
 
 
Figure 10.   SPAWAR Organization Chart, circa 2005 
 
With the PMTO contracts set to expire January 31, 
2005, the next generation contracting strategy had to be 
crafted and incorporate innovations and mandates that had 
developed over the prior five years.  The organizations 
wanted to address the issues of: cost savings/competition; 
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performance based contracting; small business goals; 
flexibility in contract type, capacity and duration; ease 
of use; common processes; and other management issues.  
These new contracts would comply with DoD’s goal that 50 
percent of all services contracting be Performance Based by 
2005.  There was recognition that PBSA would effect how 
work statements were written, how acceptable performance 
was defined, assessed, and incentivized.  There was also a 
concern of how to handle the management burden that had 
been shifted to industry under the PMTO contracts, either 
by absorbing it back into an even further downsized 
Government or crafted into a competitive environment of 
Multiple Award Contracts. 
At the conclusion of the source selection, the five 
PMTO contracts were replaced by eleven MAC/PBSA contracts.  
One work statement was developed for the Program Management 
work previously performed by BAH under the PMTO contract, 
and another for the Engineering, Logistics, Installation 
Support, and Test and Evaluation (ELITE) support efforts 
previously performed by the four small business prime 
contractors under the PMTO.  These efforts were separated 
to ensure that the work that had been performed by small 
business prime contractors under PMTO remained available 
specifically to that sector in the succeeding contracting 
strategy, whereas both large and small business could 
propose for the Program Management work statement.  There 
are now four prime contract holders for the Program 
Management contracts and seven small businesses for the 
ELITE efforts. 
  81
These contracts are Cost Plus Award Term, with a two 
year base period, and four six-month award terms.  Due to 
the relatively short time since award, there is no data to 
evaluate the impact of moving to PBSA MAC contracts on 
either Government or industry. 
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter captures the case study of a Government 
organization over more than five years’ of evolving 
contracting strategy to provide technical support services 
to its program offices.  It presented the various 
approaches and strategies used to accommodate the 
requirements and mandates at each stage, and to aid in 
achieving the organization’s mission. In this chapter, each 
contracting strategy seen as a reflection of the 
convergence of warfighter requirements, national interest, 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By drawing on the survey, research, and survey 
responses, this chapter focuses on, isolates and identifies 
potential opportunities for process improvement or existing 
deficiencies.  There are two goals in this chapter: First, 
there is potential application of the findings toward 
improving the process and end result of utilizing technical 
support services.  Equally important is the possible 
awareness that certain instances will offer no ability to 
optimize the process as there could be no opportunity to 
change or improve the process. However, that resultant 
situational awareness alone is valuable in that it allows 
the organization to recognize and quantify or qualify the 
inefficiency.   
All data that is referenced here is found in the 
preceding chapters, and is used to draw the conclusions and 
recommendations. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Government Respondents 
a. How is the Decision Made by Government to 
Utilize These Services, to the Extent and 
for the Purposes It Does? 
The largest grouping of responses in Chapter V to 
this question cited that the decision was premised on 
augmentation of the Government workforce.  Only slightly 
more than one third cited credible analysis and 
quantification substantiating the decision, with 27 percent 
indicating such contracting was a result of inertia from 
long-standing office or program policy.  This leads the 
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author to conclude there might be opportunity to reexamine 
the requirement for the amount of work contracted out to 
industry. 
b. What are the Differences Between Government 
and Industry Work Product? 
It is noted that in Chapter 5 at least one 
respondent cited a scenario wherein contractors “…appear to 
be acting as Government personnel.”  This is the first 
indication of a need to address inherently Governmental 
responsibilities. The issue is compounded by the 
diminishing Government workforce cited in Chapter II and 
collocation of the personnel within Government spaces. The 
author concludes that although the awareness was shown, 
there is a lack of understanding of what exactly it means 
to both Government and contractor personnel, and how to 
preserve these responsibilities in a day-to-day office 
environment.   
c. What is the Process and Frequency to Re-
Examine the Need and Usage for Contractors? 
The analysis in Chapter V showed a contradiction 
between the answers here and to question (a).  The author 
concludes that the inputs to question (a) referred to the 
actual base decision to proceed with a contract, while the 
process and frequency referenced here relates to how to 
fund and continue the resultant contract.  This conclusion 
is founded on fact that the reviews are keyed to spend-
plans, so possibly are driven by availability of budgets 
and funding, vice requirements.  The combined inputs to 
this and question (a) above lead to the further conclusion 
that there is clear opportunity for more requirements based 
analysis as to the need to contract for technical support 
of specific functions.  
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d. How Do You Obtain Contractor Support?  
The response quoted in Chapter V presented 
personal observation that Government personnel used 
technical services support contracts to “….get to 
individuals that they wanted on the technical team.”  This 
is contrary to the premise of PBSA, wherein the Government 
articulates its requirements, then allows the contractor to 
satisfy that requirement however and with whomever it 
chooses, and in turn is measured on its success according 
to agreed upon criteria.  This input epitomizes one of the 
biggest challenges with PBSA and MACs, which is the 
necessity of decoupling the dispassionate process, and 
allowing a requirements-driven competition, from the human 
aspects.  The author concludes there is need for an 
educational and cultural shift to PBSA still to be 
accomplished in order to achieve the potential benefits. 
e. How Do You Evaluate the Success of Those 
Services and the Benefit to the Government?  
How Do You Convey That Level of Success to 
the Performer?  
Chapters II and IV discussed the need for 
Government to clearly articulate what it wants and expects 
as a result of the contract, must do the research to select 
a contractor who can fulfill that stated expectation, and 
must motivate and incentivize the contractor to perform and 
deliver.  It is also critical that the Government establish 
clear criteria, which is reflected in a formal quality 
assurance program, by which to measure performance.  The 
responses present little evidence that there is, in 
actuality, an appropriate degree of evaluation and feedback 
necessary to adequately execute PBSA.  This also indicates 
a conflict in behavior, wherein the contracting 
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organization embarks on a prescribed strategy, in this case 
PBSA and MAC, yet communicates and interacts with the 
contracted entity in a different manner.  The author 
believes this would place the contracted entity in an 
inefficient position. 
f. Is There any Method to Quantify the Return 
on Investment?  
The respondents reported no metrics or clear 
analysis as to the value of using program resources for 
contracted technical support services.  As described 
numerous times throughout this thesis, a formal and 
achievable quality assurance program is a fundamental 
premise of PBSA.  The author concludes a QAP would provide 
base data to evaluate a return on investment, yet there 
appears to be a lack of understanding on writing and 
monitoring one, which is effective.  
g. How Have/Will Either of (PBSA or MACs) 
Effect Program Execution or How You Perform 
Your Job?  
There were several salient points in the 
responses which merit attention.  The author believes that 
the 18 percent who indicated in Chapter V “no effect on the 
program execution or job performance” was an indication of 
the lack of understanding of what PBSA and MACs entail, 
particularly in the pre-award stage.  This is when a 
significant amount of work is necessary to ensure clear 
articulation of the requirements and the QAP to which the 
contractor will be measured. 
One comment introduced the challenge of 
Organizational Conflict of Interest, in that “contractor 
personnel involved in developing and maintaining spend 
plans are employees of the companies that bid on the 
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proposals.”  The dilemma is that the Government must 
ensure, both in actuality and in perception, that any MAC 
is in fact an open and equitable competition.  If one party 
who bids on work has prior access and knowledge of the 
program’s funding and contracting plans, it clearly could 
compromise the integrity of a “level playing field”. 
The author gives much credence to the input found 
on page 39.  The respondent details the difficulty and 
amount of effort involved with PBSA for mess attendant 
services, a requirement with “very predictable requirements 
and very structured inspection process.”  Having the prior 
experience with an environment which lends itself to PBSA, 
the respondent continues with much pessimism as to the 
success of “…applying objective performance measurements to 
very subjective efforts…” in using PBSA for professional 
support services.  
2.  Industry Respondents 
a. How is the Decision Made by Government to 
Utilize These Services, to the Extent and 
for the Purposes It Does?  
As noted in Chapter IV, the author found it 
curious that, while Government respondents interpreted the 
question as it was intended, industry respondents almost 
universally interpreted it as an inquiry as to why the 
respondent’s company was awarded a contract.  The intent of 
the question was to investigate whether the industry 
representative was aware of the Government’s analysis 
leading to its decision to outsource the work, but 
apparently was not recognized by the respondents.  When put 
in context with the other industry responses, the author  
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concludes this might exemplify industry’s lack of 
understanding or confidence in Government’s program 
management.   
b. What Government Process are You Aware of to 
Re-examine the Need and Usage Your Services? 
Where 82 percent of the Government respondents 
reported in Chapter V that a review is conducted at least 
annually to assess the need for contractor support, 
industry was evenly split as to whether this occurred.  The 
majority of those who responded in the affirmative 
referenced an annual review, as did the Government 
respondents.  The words “inept” and “best 
guesses/intuitions” are of note.  The one input which cited 
measurable and specific reductions, which might indicate a 
clear methodology, is then derailed in that there was “…no 
justification…except that it is about a 40 percent 
reduction…”.  
The author concludes this is an area wherein the 
Government might either improve its process, or, if the 
processes are in place, do better in conveying its 
methodology. 
c. How Do You Evaluate the Success of Those 
Services and the Benefit to the Government?  
How Does the Government Convey That Level of 
Success to You as the Performer?  
There was one reference to a “Quality Assurance 
Program”, but the author believes this indicated a 
corporate program vice a formal Quality Assurance Plan 
within a PBSA contract or task.  As with the analysis of 
the Government responses, the author concludes there is 
much need to improvement the writing, use and monitoring of 
QAPs. 
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The author also notes that industry respondents 
did not articulate the same conflict in behavior between 
prescribed strategy and actual execution that the 
Government respondents indicated.  In view of the obvious 
candor of the inputs, this absence is of interest.  
This is another area where the author concludes 
the Government might either improve its process, or, if the 
processes are in place, do better in conveying its 
methodology. 
d. How Have/Will Either of (PBSA Or MACs) 
Effect Your Decisions on What Tasks to 
Compete for or How You Perform Your Job? 
With exception of the one reference to B&P costs, 
there was minimal tangible, quantifiable impact cited.  The 
author believes this is a significant oversight on behalf 
of both industry and Government.  MACs require strategic 
and aggressive responses by industry, and PBSA requires a 
skilled proposal management workforce to knowledgably 
respond to the work statement and ask necessary clarifying 
questions.  Further, industry is competing with Government 
for the same pool of skilled acquisition professionals, 
especially in light of a high number of Government 
retirements.  The author concludes this potentially could 
result in a situation where industry salaries are driven 
upward, while Government is creating an ever-increasing 
competitive environment where cost control is rewarded.  
The author further concludes there is an inherent conflict 
when market forces drive up salaries and thus costs, and 
competition for contract awards is fostered in an effort to 
keep costs down.      
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The candor on the survey responses, paralleled 
with review and research of current publications, lead to 
several conclusions: 
1. There is managerial commitment to execute 
PBSA and MAC mandates by the representative organizations.  
This is evidenced by the broad scale inclusion of the 
concepts into the contracting strategies. 
2. Organizational behavior with the Government 
does not demonstrate adoption of these concepts.  “Level-
of-effort” behavior continues regardless of the contracting 
concept.  This means that, although metrics might indicate 
usage of the contracts might be increasing, there is 
significant opportunity lost in obtaining the desired 
results and benefits. 
3. The challenge of instituting and quantifying 
the impact of PBSA and MACs in a professional services 
environment has not been addressed to the degree necessary 
to allow and encourage proper execution by Government and 
industry personnel.   
4. There is genuine naivety and confusion as to 
a “proper” Government/industry working relationship.  
5. There is further complication when 
Government and industry personnel are collocated on a daily 
basis, as is common in a professional office environment.  
This greatly diminishes the ability to effect a clear 
delineation between the roles of the two workforces and the 
ability perform a true PBSA relationship. 
6. The ability to write, monitor, and interpret 
an effective QAP is lacking.  
  91
7. In several areas, there is a lack in 
communicating that Government is effectively invoking and 
executing these processes, in the instances when this does 
occur. 
8. These factors contribute to conflicting 
messages to industry, which again leads to inefficiency and 
loss of opportunity in obtaining the desired results and 
benefits.  
9. There was an absence of reference to the 
financial impact on industry  
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Through the research conducted in the previous 
chapters the following recommendations are suggested: 
1. In addition to mandating the use of PBSA and 
MACs, organizational management should demonstrate the 
desired behavior and results.  This would entail handling 
the pre-award of such contracts, followed by post-award 
execution “by the book”, vice level of effort support. 
2. In event of conflicting communication from the 
Government, the establishment of industry recourse with no 
retribution, such as use of a contract ombudsman, could be 
an avenue to behavior modification.  Specifically, on 
occasions when a PBSA contract is awarded and the awardee 
is not given the latitude to execute in a PBSA manner 
(i.e., to determine by itself the methods and means to 
achieve successful results), a strong and well respected, 
but savvy and tactful ombudsman could help navigate the 
situation to the satisfaction and benefit of both parties. 
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3. A lack of pertinent and specific training is an 
underlying and recurring message.  Although training 
opportunities are on the rise, particularly through the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), there is a critical 
need to give the particular knowledge necessary for program 
office, contracting, administering personnel to competently 
perform pre- and post-award functions, along with assisting 
co-workers through the processes.  A challenge is in the 
timing of such training: too early or generic makes the 
material stale or not applicable to the instant 
requirement, yet the flurry and demands of pre-award 
requirements do not allow attention to be diverted from the 
tasks at hand.  This is exasperated by the downsizing of 
the Government workforce, one of the driving factors which 
led to the current environment of contracting, as discussed 
in Chapter II.  It is possible for a wider range of 
application and accessibility in training opportunities 
might further aid the workforce in meeting the challenges 
of PBSA and MACs. 
4. Identification and establishment of viable and 
pertinent metrics is a challenge, but would be a fuller 
indicator of success.  Whereas the mere number of PBSA and 
MAC contracts gives a data point, a quantification and 
qualification of the trends and resultant change would fill 
out the picture.  As evidenced by the survey results, 
behavioral change must follow the mandated actions.  The 
author particularly recommends a measure of the cost in 
time, effort or funds, of implementing PBSA and MACs to 
evaluate the true value and benefit of this change. 
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5. The author is also curious as to the development, 
usage, and surveillance of Quality Assurance Plans (QAPs).  
The survey results indicated a marked lack of recognition 
from both Government and industry as to the importance and 
potential of QAPs in the successful performance of PBSA 
contracts.  Although the incorporation of a QAP is 
necessary to the contract or task award, little reference 
to post-award surveillance was presented, which indicates a 
significant area for improvement.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the survey inputs and identified 
conflicts and gaps in the responses.  A conflict would be 
the result of opposing or significantly differing 
observations from the two respondent populations.  One 
possible explanation is inadequate communication as to the 
subject matter or process.  A parallel explanation is 
cognitive dissonance, which should be recognized and might 
be readily corrected.  A gap indicates a more significant 
problem, in that neither group recognized or interpreted a 
subject matter that could reasonably be expected to be 
known or understood.  The absence of reference to 
surveillance and enforcement of QAPs is one example of a 
gap.  These areas might be addressed with wider-spread, 
more accessible and specific training, and merits more 
study and research.  These issues were discussed as 
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY 
A. FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONDENTS 
1. Do you utilize technical support contractor services? 
2. If so, for what functions or in what capacity? 
3. How is the decision made by Government to utilize 
these services, to the extent and for the purposes it does? 
4. What are the differences between Government and 
industry work product? 
5. What is the process and frequency to re-examine the 
need and usage for contractors? 
6. How do you obtain contractor support? 
7. How do you interact with those personnel and receive 
the specified services and deliverables? 
8. How do you evaluate the success of those services and 
the benefit to the Government?  How do you convey that 
level of success to the performer? 
9. Is there any method to quantify the return on 
investment? 
10. What other experiences do you have with contracted 
technical support? (For example, under what situations or 
through what types of contracts?) 
11. Are you familiar with Performance Based Services 
Contracts or Multiple Award Contracts? 
12. How have/will either of these contract methods effect 
program execution or how you perform your job? 
13. Is there quantification as to the effect these 




B. FOR INDUSTRY RESPONDENTS 
1. What extent of your business is with Federal 
Government, specifically with Dept of Defense? 
2. Is your company large or small business? 
3. What types of technical support services do you 
provide? (what functions or in what capacity) 
4. How is the decision made by Government to utilize 
these services, to the extent and for the purposes it does? 
5. What are the differences between Government and 
industry work product? 
6. What Government process are you aware of to re-examine 
the need and usage for your services? 
7. How do you interact with the pertinent Government 
personnel and provide the specified services and 
deliverables? 
8. How do you evaluate the success of those services and 
the benefit to the Government? 
9. How does Government convey that level of success to 
you as the performer? 
10. What other experiences do you have with providing 
contracted technical support?  (For example, under what 
situations or through what types of contracts?) 
11. Are you familiar with Performance Based Services 
Contracts or Multiple Award Contracts? 
12. How have/will either of these contract methods effect 
your decisions on what tasks to compete for or how you 
perform your job? 
13. Is there quantification as to the effect these 




APPENDIX B. GLOSSARY 
B&P Bid and Proposal 
BRAC Base Realignment and Closure  
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance  
COR Contracting Officer’s Representative  
CPAF Cost Plus Award Fee 
CPAR Contractor Performance Appraisal Report  
CPFF Cost Plus Fixed Fee  
CPIF Cost Plus Incentive Fee  
DAWIA Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement 
Act  
DoD Department of Defense  
DSMC Defense Services Military College  
FFP Firm Fixed Price  
FPIF Fixed Price Incentive Fee  
FTE Full Time Equivalent  
IDIQ Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity  
MAC Multiple Award Contract  
NPR National Performance Review 
PBC Performance Based Contracting  
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 
PBSA Performance Based Service Acquisition 
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ROI Return on Investment  
SOW Statement of Work 
TPOC Technical Point of Contact 
WBS Work Breakdown Schedule 
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